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he structure and regulation of a country’s financial 
markets and institutions are the focus of considerable 
policy attention for a number of economic and political 
reasons. Banks and other financial institutions encourage and 
collect the savings that finance a country’s economic growth. 
By allocating the savings to enterprises and monitoring the use 
of the funds, the institutions and the markets play an integral 
role in the corporate governance system that ultimately affects 
the productivity of resources throughout the economy. Banks 
and other financial institutions also play an integral role in 
transmitting the government’s monetary and credit policies to 
the rest of the economy. Parts of the financial sector are 
effectively regulated as a means to provide subsidized credit or 
services to targeted groups (including the government itself) 
and to protect particular groups from such activities as 
competition, hostile takeovers, and expropriation.
Although the economics of financial regulation have been 
studied extensively (Herring and Santomero 1999 and 
Kroszner 1998a), the politics have received less—albeit 
increasing—attention. Rather than taking regulations as given, 
the political-economy approach attempts to provide a positive 
analysis of how and why regulations evolve as they do and what 
forces can lead to their durability as well as to their potential for 
change. This perspective offers an alternate lens through which 
one can analyze regulation, and it complements the traditional 
normative analysis undertaken by economists studying 
“optimal” regulation. 
When the infamous American bank robber Willie Sutton 
was asked why he robbed banks, he replied, “That’s where the 
money is.” The same might be said for why there is such 
government involvement in the banking and financial 
system—that’s where the money is. In the next section, I briefly 
outline a number of political-economy approaches to 
understanding government involvement in the economy and, 
in doing so, I examine why the banking and financial system 
appears to be particularly vulnerable to politicization. 
Afterward, I apply these approaches to an investigation of 
why there has been such extensive deregulatory reform in 
banking and financial services during the past quarter-century. 
I focus on the breakdown of legal barriers that, until the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999, 
had separated banking, securities, and insurance activities. 
However, I also touch on other major reforms, such as the 
elimination of legal barriers to the geographic expansion of 
banks within states and across state lines. The political-
economy approach helps to identify technological, legal, and 
economic shocks that disturbed the long-standing regulatory 
equilibrium in banking and financial markets. I conclude with 
a brief note on the role that traditional academic evaluations of 
regulation can still play in the policy-reform process of interest 
group competition filtered through government decision-
making institutions.
Randall S. Kroszner
The author thanks the University of Chicago Law School, where he was the 
John M. Olin Visiting Fellow in Law and Economics when this paper was 
written, and the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation for support from a 
grant to the George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the 
State, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago. The views 
expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System.
The Economics and Politics 
of Financial Modernization
Randall S. Kroszner is a professor of economics at the University of Chicago’s 
Graduate School of Business. http://gsbwww.uchicago.edu/fac/
randall.kroszner/research/
T26 The Economics and Politics of Financial Modernization
Approaches to the Political Economy 
of Regulatory Change
Economists, political scientists, and policy reformers have 
developed a variety of positive theories to explain how 
government intervention and regulation occur and how and 
when they change (Rodrik 1996). Five related approaches that 
have been used to analyze these phenomena fall under the 
classifications “public interest,” “private interest,” “ideology,” 
“institutions,” and “leviathan.” Although these approaches are 
not mutually exclusive, they emphasize different aspects of the 
interaction between economics and politics, and each captures 
an important element in the process. I now discuss each 
approach briefly and apply them to an understanding of 
various aspects of banking and financial regulation and 
deregulation.1
Public Interest 
This is the traditional “civics class” term that economists once 
used to explain regulation: banking and financial regulations 
exist to correct market failures and protect poorly informed 
consumers from harm.2 From this perspective, regulatory 
intervention occurs primarily to maximize social welfare, so 
this approach is often called the public interest theory of 
regulation. Public interest rationales, for instance, are used to 
explain how government deposit insurance and capital 
regulation provide for a sound banking system, because the 
stability of the financial system can have spillover effects for 
general macroeconomic performance (Diamond and Dybvig 
1983, King and Levine 1993, Jayaratne and Strahan 1996, and 
Kaufman and Kroszner 1997). 
A key challenge facing the public interest view is that many 
forms of regulation have little or no redeeming social value. 
Entry restrictions that protect banks or other financial 
institutions from competition, portfolio restrictions that 
hinder diversification, and geographic restrictions that prevent 
expansion within a country or across national borders 
generally are difficult to rationalize on public interest grounds. 
Regulation that does not appear to serve a public interest is also 
common in other sectors (Stigler 1988).
Regardless of whether it may have a public interest ration-
ale, regulation has significant distributional consequences.
The parties affected by the regulation thus have an incentive to 
try to ensure that the government structures the regulation so 
as to benefit them. A public interest argument is often used to 
mask the private interests that the intervention serves. Indeed, 
private interests may try to confuse the public debate by 
providing false or misleading information that makes it 
difficult to discern which policy would improve social welfare 
(Kane 1996 and Dewatripont and Tirole 1999). 
Private Interest 
The private interest theory of regulation, also called the 
economic theory of regulation, characterizes the regulatory 
process as one of interest group competition in which compact, 
well-organized groups are able to use the coercive power of the 
state to capture rents for themselves at the expense of more 
dispersed groups (Olson 1965, Stigler 1971, Peltzman 1976, 
1989, and Becker 1983). Changes in the size, strength, and 
organization of interest groups thus provide the key to 
understanding policy changes. Regulated groups may be 
sufficiently powerful so as to influence the politicians and the 
regulatory bureaucracy to serve primarily the interests of those 
subject to the regulation. In other words, the regulated group 
“captures” the regulators; hence, this is sometimes called the 
capture theory of regulation. 
The incentives for such regulatory behavior may be direct or 
indirect. Pressure may be exerted directly on politicians, 
through campaign contributions or votes. The politicians may 
then pass a new statute or pressure the regulators to act 
sympathetically toward the interest group. Indirect incentives 
may come through regulators understanding that cooperative 
behavior may be rewarded with lucrative employment 
opportunities in the industry after leaving the government, 
a practice so common in the past with Japanese Ministry of 
Finance officials that it is euphemistically called amakudari, the 
“descent from heaven.” 
The effectiveness of the interest groups depends on a 
number of factors. First, cohesive groups will find it easier to 
organize and overcome free-rider problems in lobbying for 
regulations that may benefit them. Producers of goods and 
services tend to be more compact and better organized than 
consumers, so there is a tendency for regulation, on net, to 
benefit producers more than consumers (Stigler 1971).3 The 
ability of a group to organize is often inversely related to its size, 
but many labor unions and trade organizations have been able 
to develop effective lobbying bodies through carefully crafted 
incentives that provide a variety of information and support 
services in return for membership (Olson 1965). The 
Independent Community Bankers of America (formerly the 
Independent Bankers Association of America), for example, 
has been very effective at organizing and representing the 
interests of small banks. 
Second, groups tend to be more effective not only when the 
benefits are concentrated among group members but also 
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A compact group of potential “losers,” each of whom would 
experience high losses associated with the regulation, are likely 
to form a lobby that will try to counteract the original interest 
group’s pressure. Interest groups most directly affected by the 
regulation may also attempt to build a broader coalition to 
lobby for or against the regulation.4
In the long legislative debate over the expansion of bank 
powers, banks, securities firms, and insurance companies 
organized powerful lobbying organizations that focused much 
of their energy on battling each other (Kroszner and Stratmann 
1998). Until 1999, the numerous major legislative initiatives 
during the previous fifteen years were thwarted by strenuous 
lobbying efforts by the rival groups. In 1995, for example, even 
though the chairmen of both the House and Senate Banking 
Committees, the President, the chairmen of the Federal 
Reserve Board, and the Comptroller of the Currency supported 
expanded bank powers, a broad banking reform bill was again 
killed by interest group wrangling: “It was Wall Street securities 
firms and insurance companies that helped kill a bill to repeal 
the Glass-Steagall Act and allow banks to enter their markets” 
(New York Times, December 23, 1995, p. 19). 
Third, in addition to the diffusion of costs across different 
groups, the level of the costs relative to the benefits obtained by 
the interest group plays an important role (Becker 1983). 
Deadweight loss is defined as precisely the difference between 
the “winner’s” benefit minus the loser’s cost from the change in 
output generated by the regulation. Factors affecting the 
“efficiency” of the regulatory or transfer mechanism thus may 
have an important impact on political outcomes. As the 
deadweight loss grows, for example, the losers are losing more 
for each dollar of the winner’s gain. When this gap widens, 
losers have a greater incentive to fight each dollar of the 
winner’s gain and the winners have less incentive to fight for 
each dollar of the loser’s loss. In other words, when deadweight 
losses are high, an interest group faces greater opposition to its 
protective regulation on the margin and hence it is less likely to 
be successful.5 
Similarly, politicians in electoral democracies are concerned 
about finding an optimal support coalition to promote their 
reelection chances, so they take into account the marginal costs 
and benefits to different groups. The rents generated by 
regulation in an electoral democracy thus are likely to be spread 
among different groups, even though one group may be the 
primary beneficiary (Peltzman 1976).6 Regulation that protects 
financial institutions from competition and subsidized 
government deposit insurance to banks generate rents for this 
sector that are then partially shared through directed credit 
allocation.7
The private interest theory thus helps to explain why the 
banking and financial system is particularly susceptible to 
political influence. The banking system provides an effective 
but off-balance-sheet way for the government to redistribute 
resources (Kroszner 1999a). Few, if any, other sectors provide 
the same degree of flexibility to redistribute resources, whether 
implicitly through Bank of Japan “window guidance” or 
explicitly through statutes such as the Community 
Reinvestment Act. Credit allocation through financial 
institutions can be an important implicit or explicit part of a 
government’s industrial policy.8 Banks and financial 
institutions may be induced to act, at least in part, as implicit 
fiscal arms of the state, but they must be compensated through 
protective regulation.
Since the government is so heavily involved in banking, it 
may be very difficult to have effective government regulation of 
the domestic banking and financial sectors. In these 
circumstances, simply hiring more and better trained 
supervisors and adopting good regulatory principles are not 
sufficient strategies because the government may have little 
incentive to enforce rules of sound banking, either on state-
owned banks or privately owned ones. The codependence of 
the banks on the government and of the politicians on the 
banking industry allows problems to grow unchecked, as 
shown by the depth of banking troubles in the Asian countries 
experiencing currency crises.
This linkage may also help to explain why governments 
cannot seem to avoid bailouts of the financial sector, even as 
officials acknowledge and decry the moral hazard problems of 
the bailouts themselves. These perverse incentives are not 
unique to developing countries, as illustrated by the long delays 
in responding to the savings and loan crisis in the United States 
and the banking problems in Japan.
Ideology 
Although the private interest theory has had much success in 
explaining a wide variety of regulatory interventions that are 
difficult to rationalize on public interest grounds, it has been 
less effective in explaining the widespread economic 
deregulation that has taken place in many countries during the 
past two decades (see Peltzman [1989] and Noll [1989], but 
also see Kroszner and Strahan [1999]). Many political scientists 
and some economists emphasize the importance of the beliefs 
and “ideology” of voters and politicians to explain regulation 
and deregulation (Kalt and Zupan 1984 and Poole and 
Rosenthal 1997). Differences over time across countries or 
among citizens in their general beliefs about government’s 
appropriate role in economic affairs might affect the extent of 
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fears of excessive concentration of power in the hands of the 
financial elite were a driving force behind many banking and 
financial regulations in the early part of this century, using the 
1933 Glass-Steagall Act’s restriction of commercial bank 
powers as an example (Hellwig [1999], however, offers an 
alternative interpretation).
Poole and Rosenthal (1997) have developed a useful 
measure of ideology based on roll-call voting that rates 
legislators on a simple left-right scale. This ideology measure 
has had much success in accounting for a wide variety of 
economic regulation and deregulation not well explained by 
private interest group variables or party politics. Berglof and 
Rosenthal (1999), for example, analyze bankruptcy law in the 
United States and find that this measure of ideology is a key 
element in understanding the voting patterns on bankruptcy 
legislation during the past two centuries. Poole and Rosenthal 
(1993) also find an important role for ideology in the battles 
over the origins of the economic legislator in the United States 
during the nineteenth century.
Identifying the driving forces behind changes in ideology 
over time, however, has been difficult. Margaret Thatcher and 
Ronald Reagan are said to have embodied a shift toward a pro-
market ideology, but an exogenous change in ideology is an 
unsatisfying explanation for a sustained move toward 
deregulation and privatization. This is particularly true when 
one recalls that the first major deregulatory action of the 1970s 
concerning airlines was initiated by a liberal Democrat from 
the northeast, Edward M. Kennedy. Also, airline and trucking 
deregulation and the first phase of federal banking 
deregulation—the 1980 Depository Institutions Deregulation 
and Monetary Control Act—were passed by Democrat-
controlled Congresses and signed by a President who was a 
Democrat. What constitutes ideology and whether it can be 
measured independent of economic interests is the subject of 
an extensive and ongoing controversy (see Peltzman [1984] 
and overviews by Bender and Lott [1996] and Poole and 
Rosenthal [1996]). 
Institutions 
The new institutional economics approach emphasizes 
transaction costs and institutional arrangements for decision 
making as key factors influencing the outcome of the policy 
process (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1988, North 1990, 
Williamson 1996, Alston, Eggertsson, and North 1996, Dixit 
1996, and Irwin and Kroszner 1999). This approach examines 
how alternative policymaking structures (such as delegation to 
an independent agency versus a parliamentary vote versus an 
executive order) influence the incentives of both special 
interests and governmental actions to shape policy. 
Opportunities for vote trading and issue linkages, for example, 
may differ under alternative structures and can confer 
advantages (like agenda control) to particular players. These 
institutional and transaction cost features in turn can affect the 
incentives for interest groups to organize as well as the 
efficiency of their lobbying efforts. Interest group size and 
strength, therefore, is not given, but may be endogenous 
(Irwin and Kroszner 1999).
The regulation of bank powers illustrates the endogeneity of 
interests with respect to the regulatory framework (Kroszner 
1996). In 1933, the United States adopted the Glass-Steagall 
Act, which fragmented the U.S. financial system by strictly 
limiting the powers of commercial banks. In particular, 
commercial banks could not engage in securities underwriting, 
much in contrast with the classic German universal banks and 
banks in many parts of Europe. While there does not appear to 
be an economic justification for such a separation (Kroszner 
and Rajan 1994, 1997, and Kroszner 2000b), there may be a 
redeeming feature in terms of the political economy of 
financial regulation. 
The silver lining to the cloud of Glass-Steagall is that a rich 
variety of alternate financial services providers has developed 
in the United States and they compete in both the financial 
market and the market for financial regulation. In Germany, 
for example, the early implicit state fostering of strong, 
universal banks allowed the banks to capture the regulatory 
system and thwart the development of alternate institutions 
and markets. In the United States, well-organized groups have 
helped to establish competing regulatory bodies that are likely 
to keep the market for financial regulation far from being a 
monopoly, even after the Financial Modernization Act of 1999. 
As I describe in the section on the leviathan approach, 
competition among regulators plays an important role, parallel 
to that of competition among the interest groups.
Before turning to the leviathan approach, however, I want to 
emphasize another aspect of the institutional structure of 
policy decision making—namely, the committee structure of 
Congress—to clarify another aspect of interest group 
activities—namely, the strategies that the groups use in 
competing with each other for influence over policy outcomes. 
The committee structure of Congress, in which standing 
committees have specialized jurisdiction over particular policy 
issues, creates opportunities for vote trading and issue linkages 
that may affect coalition formation and policy outcomes 
(Shepsle and Weingast 1987 and Weingast and Marshall 1988). 
Committee members, by virtue of their gatekeeping control 
over legislation in their ambit, may have a disproportionate 
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1995). Committees may consist of either preference “outliers,” 
who have intense views not representative of the rest of the 
legislature, or policy experts, who gather and process 
information in order to make well-informed decisions, perhaps 
as part of the execution of the major party’s agenda (Hall and 
Grofman 1990, Krehbiel 1991, Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991, 
and Cox and McCubbins 1993). 
Each standing committee operates as a forum in which the 
legislators and the interest groups repeatedly interact, and 
repeated dealing allows legislators to develop credible policy 
positions among the rival interests (Kroszner and Stratmann 
1998). The special interests lobby and provide campaign 
contributions through their political action committees 
(PACs) to the committee members and determine who their 
supporters are by observing the actions that the legislators take. 
They then continue to reward their supporters with 
contributions, and this process then helps the legislators to 
maximize special interest contributions (Kroszner and 
Stratmann 1998, 2000). 
The financial services sector is the largest source of PAC 
campaign contributions in the United States, accounting for 
roughly 20 percent of total contributions, but most of these 
funds have been spent on battles among rival banking, 
insurance, and securities interests rather than on battling the 
consumer (Kroszner and Stratmann 1998). During the long 
struggle over financial services modernization legislation, these 
competing groups focused their contributions on members of 
the Banking Committees, relative to the rest of Congress, but 
not on the same Banking Committee members. In our analysis 
of financial services PAC contribution patterns (Kroszner and 
Stratmann 1998), we show that House Banking Committee 
members who received more contributions from commercial 
banks tended to receive fewer contributions from insurance 
companies and securities houses, and vice versa. The 
committee members appeared to be building consistent 
reputations for supporting one of the rival groups, rather than 
playing on both sides of the fence. 
We also find that the longer a legislator stays on the House 
Banking Committee, the more his sources of PAC contri-
butions become concentrated in one of the three rival financial 
services groups. This pattern of how PAC contributions from 
the rival groups evolve over a legislator’s career again suggests 
that through repeated actions on the Banking Committee (such 
as introducing legislation, offering amendments, holding 
hearings, talking to the media, and voting), the legislator builds 
a clear and consistent reputation on these policy issues. The 
competing banking, insurance, and securities PACs learn the 
reliability of each Banking Committee member with respect to 
their own interests and reward their own supporters. Those 
legislators who have a high proportion of PACs that repeatedly 
contribute to them, which could be considered a rough 
measure of the reputational consistency of a legislator on a set 
of policy issues, tend to receive higher levels of PAC 
contributions than those who have few PACs that repeatedly 
give to them (Kroszner and Stratmann 2000). Long-term 
relationships develop between the rival interest groups and the 
House Banking Committee members, and thus it is an 
important feature of the strategies that the rival interests 
pursue in trying to influence financial services modernization 
legislation.
Leviathan 
Politicians and bureaucrats may be considered a distinct 
interest group concerned about expanding its size and 
influence over the economy. Niskanen (1971) and Brennan 
and Buchanan (1977) suggest that an objective of the 
government may be to maximize or, on the margin, increase its 
size and expenditures. This view has been characterized as the 
leviathan approach. 
The fiscal demands of the government help to explain part 
of the close relationship between politics and the banking and 
financial sectors and the origins of numerous regulations. 
Geographic restrictions on banks in the United States, for 
example, arose in the early nineteenth century as a way for state 
governments to maximize revenues from the sale of bank 
charters by providing a series of local monopolies (Kroszner 
1997a). These initial restrictions created a constituency of 
small banks that then organized to protect their vested interest 
to maintain branching restrictions.9 The federal government 
began to grant national bank charters during the U.S. Civil War 
to create a new class of banks that would hold federal debt and 
thereby facilitate the financing of the war effort. The Bank of 
England was founded as a way to aid in the financing of the 
Crown in England. More recently, as governments have come 
to rely more heavily on deficit financing through the issuance 
of sovereign debt, reforms of the government securities 
markets around the world can be understood from this 
perspective (Kroszner 1997b).10 Debt moratoria, debt 
abrogation, and changes to bankruptcy law can also be seen in 
this light (Berglof and Rosenthal 1999, Bolton and Rosenthal 
1999, and Kroszner 1999b). 
In the financial services modernization debate, as noted in 
the previous section, competition among regulators has played 
an important role. Both the Federal Reserve and the Treasury 
wished to be the main supervisor of banks with expanded 
powers. The Federal Reserve had been the main regulator of 
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of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), had been the main 
regulator of nationally chartered banks. If new financial powers 
were permitted to take place within the bank or a subsidiary of 
the bank itself, then the responsibility to regulate the new 
activities could fall to the OCC. In contrast, if the new powers 
were permitted only within separate subsidiaries of a bank 
holding company—not the bank—then the Federal Reserve 
would be the main regulator. 
While there are a number of interesting and important 
issues concerning the role of the legal corporate structure of 
full-service financial services firms (Kroszner and Rajan 1997), 
the debate between the regulators was primarily over which 
one would be the dominant regulator in the future. The 
outcome would affect the size and influence of the regulatory 
staffs of the agencies. The controversy between the two over the 
appropriate structure for what eventually became financial 
holding companies was parallel to the rivalry among the 
banking, insurance, and securities interests described above. 
After much lobbying by both sides, the resolution of the 
difference largely has been in the Federal Reserve’s favor, for it 
has “umbrella” supervisory and regulatory control over the 
financial holding companies.
Political-Economy Factors Driving 
the Recent Trend toward Financial 
Regulatory Reform
To understand why there has been so much recent regulatory 
reform in banking after little change for more than three 
decades following World War II (see table), we must try to 
identify the factors that would have disturbed the long-
standing political-economy equilibrium. The approaches to 
the political economy of regulatory change discussed above 
suggest that one look for technological, legal, and/or economic 
shocks that altered the relative strengths and effectiveness of 
competing interest groups. 
Technological change is often cited as a key force behind the 
innovations in financial markets and institutions during the 
past two decades. In the political-economy framework, 
technological improvement does more than simply shift the 
production possibility frontier for an industry. Technological 
change can have significant distributional consequences, 
completely independent of its effects on the costs and efficiency 
of production—that is, such change is rarely “distributionally 
neutral.” New products and markets bring forth new 
constituencies. Innovations affect the preexisting markets
and institutions and cause shifts in interests and alliances. 
Changing the relative strength of competing interests can then 
lead to regulatory reform.
A number of shocks, for example, have increased the supply 
elasticity of investors’ and depositors’ funds. As such, they have 
increased the competition that banks face from nonbanks and 
have eroded the value of regulation protecting geographic 
monopolies through branching regulation (Kroszner 1997a 
and Kroszner and Strahan 1999, forthcoming). As elasticities 
increase, there are fewer rents to share among competing 
groups, so regulation becomes less likely (Peltzman 1989). 
First, the introduction of the automated teller machine (ATM) 
in the early 1970s reduced the value of geographic protections 
to local banks. The small banks argued that ATMs should be 
considered bank branches, and they sued to prevent the spread 
of interstate ATM networks. The courts did not agree, and 
ATM networks grew rapidly both nationally and 
internationally.
 Second, consumer-oriented money market mutual funds 
and “cash management accounts” offered by investment banks 
arose in the early 1970s. In the high-inflation environment of 
the 1970s, Regulation Q interest rate ceilings prevented banks 
from responding to these innovations by offering market rates 
on deposits. The Glass-Steagall and Bank Holding Company 
Acts prevented banks from offering the convenience of 
integrated investment and checking accounts. 
Third, on the lending side, the increasing sophistication of 
credit-scoring techniques—following innovations in 
information-processing technology, financial theory, and the 
development of large credit databases—began to change the 
relationship characteristics of bank lending toward less 
personal and more standardized evaluation. As a result of these 
innovations, for example, securitization of mortgages, loans, 
and consumer credit has become commonplace. Commercial 
paper and junk bonds also provided competitive alternatives to 
traditional bank lending. Since technological change has 
diminished the value of specialized local knowledge that long-
established local bankers might have about the risks of 
borrowers in the community, foreign banks could enter and 
succeed in domestic markets more easily than in the past, and 
foreign bank lending increased sharply in the United States 
during the 1980s. 
These factors combined to reduce the strength of the small 
banks, which had long fought to maintain both branching and 
activity restrictions that would strengthen the large banks 
relative to them as well as increase the large banks’ desire to 
have these restrictions lifted. This combination was important 
for making financial modernization legislation a reality. Also, 
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act contains a major provision that 
will provide below-market-rate financing to “small” banks 
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Home Loan Bank System. Although the small banks are weaker 
than they once were, they are still able to obtain a valuable 
source of low-cost liquidity to soften their traditional 
opposition to the expansion of bank powers.
In addition to the technological shocks that altered the 
balance within the banking industry, a number of court 
decisions eroded the long-standing opposition by the 
insurance industry to the expansion of bank powers and the 
elimination of branching restrictions (Kroszner 1997a and 
Kroszner and Strahan forthcoming). The National Banking Act 
of 1864 and subsequent related legislation appeared to strictly 
limit bank involvement in insurance to selling insurance only 
in towns with less than 5,000 people. The extent of the 
restrictions and the precise definition of insurance products are 
ambiguous, and they are the subject of ongoing legal dispute 
between the banks and insurance companies. 
Major Legislative Changes in Bank Regulation during the 1980s and 1990s 
Legislation Year Major Provisions
Depository Institutions Deregulation 
   and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA)
1980 Raised deposit insurance from $40,000 to $100,000.
Phased out interest rate ceilings.
Allowed depositories to offer NOW accounts nationwide.
Eliminated usury ceilings.
Imposed uniform reserve requirements on all depository institutions 
   and gave them access to Federal Reserve services.
Garn-St Germain Act 1982 Permitted money market deposit accounts.
Permitted banks to purchase failing banks and thrifts across state lines.
Expanded thrift lending powers.
Competitive Equality in Banking Act (CEBA) 1987 Allocated $10.8 billion in additional funding to the FSLIC.
Authorized forbearance program for farm banks.
Reaffirmed that the “full faith and credit” of the Treasury stood behind deposit insurance.
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, 
   and Enforcement Act (FIRREA)
1989 Provided $50 billion of taxpayer funds to resolve failed thrifts.
Replaced Federal Home Loan Bank Board with the Office of Thrift Supervision 
   to regulate and supervise thrifts.
Restructured thrift deposit insurance and raised premiums.
Reimposed restrictions on thrift lending activities.
Directed the Treasury to study deposit insurance reform.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
   Improvement Act (FDICIA)
1991 Imposed risk-based deposit insurance pricing.
Required “prompt corrective action” of poorly capitalized banks and thrifts 
    and restricted “too big to fail.”
Directed the FDIC to resolve failed banks and thrifts in the least costly way to the deposit 
    insurance fund.
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking 
   and Branching Efficiency Act 
1994 Permitted banks and bank holding companies to purchase banks or establish subsidiary banks 
   in any state nationwide. Permitted national banks to open branches or convert subsidiary
   banks into branches across state lines.
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial 
   Modernization Act
1999 Authorized financial holding companies (FHCs) to engage in a full range of financial services
    such as commercial banking, insurance, securities, and merchant banking.
Gave the Federal Reserve and the Treasury discretion to authorize new financial activities 
    or complementary activities for FHCs.
Established the Federal Reserve as the “umbrella” regulator for FHCs.
Provided low-cost credit to community banks.
Reformed the Community Reinvestment Act.
Eliminated unitary thrift holding companies.32 The Economics and Politics of Financial Modernization
In 1986, the Comptroller of the Currency decided to allow 
national banks to sell any type of insurance product from small 
towns. This authority was later upheld in 1993 by the U.S. Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Independent Insurance Agents of 
America v. Ludwig. In 1995, the U.S. Supreme Court allowed 
banks to sell annuities nationwide (Valic v. Clarke), and in 1996 
the Court again expanded banks’ insurance powers by ruling in 
the Barnett Banks v. Nelson case that states could not bar 
national banks from selling insurance products from small 
towns (Seiberg 1996). The Court also implied that it would 
likely grant banks the right to sell additional types 
of insurance products if such cases were to come before it 
in the future. 
Given its losses in the courts, the insurance industry realized 
that it would be unlikely to prevent bank involvement in 
insurance through continued litigation. In addition, the phase-
out of bank branching restrictions following the 1994 Riegle-
Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act helped to 
improve the ability of banks to distribute insurance products. 
Given the increasing competition from sellers of low-cost 
insurance on-line and over the telephone, the Independent 
Insurance Agents of America was in a weakened position to 
maintain its traditional opposition to the combination of 
banking and insurance. Technological and legal shocks 
again tipped the balance in favor of major deregulatory 
reform. 
Kane (1996) argues that a major economic shock that 
generated support for bank regulatory reform was the high 
costs of the savings and loan crisis and the sharp rise in bank 
failures in the late 1980s. Prior to these events, the public and, 
perhaps, some policymakers had not been aware of the high 
costs of having government-insured institutions that were not 
well diversified. The large taxpayer-financed bailout of the 
savings and loans increased general public support for 
eliminating antiquated regulations and strengthening the 
financial system.11
In sum, technological, economic, and legal changes 
disturbed the old political-economy equilibrium. Moreover, 
these changes had important distributional consequences that 
typically are ignored in economists’ emphasis on efficiency 
issues but are central to a positive explanation of regulatory 
change.
Conclusions
The thrust of the aforementioned arguments is that interest 
group competition, filtered through the institutions of 
government decision making, plays a key role in determining 
when and how regulatory change occurs. For the expansion of 
bank powers and “financial modernization” legislation to take 
place, various shocks were necessary to alter the balance among 
the interests during the past quarter-century. These changes 
undermined the long-standing political economy supporting 
the Depression-era regulations that balkanized the U.S. 
financial system. The technological and financial innovations 
responsible for the changes are continuing to create conditions 
that are likely to lead to further reductions in regulatory 
barriers both domestically and internationally (Kroszner 1997a 
and Kroszner and Strahan 1999).
In conclusion, I offer a final note on academics’ role in the 
process of regulatory change. If interest group rivalry is a 
primary determinant of regulatory outcomes, is there any role 
for careful scholarly analyses of regulations and proposals for 
reform? In other words, does the political-economy approach 
imply that academics should just stay in their “ivory towers,” 
since their work is of little relevance to policymaking in the real 
world? Although having an organized interest group and 
money may be necessary for a view to prevail in the political 
marketplace, they are not sufficient, due to the rivalry among 
interest groups. Theory and facts, not only money and power, 
are relevant to the debates. Without an interest group to 
champion a position, however, an argument may have little 
effect. As Michael Mussa quipped, “In Washington, truth is just 
another special interest, and one that is not particularly well 
financed.” 
A logical and empirically supported argument, however, 
affects the productivity of an interest group’s lobbying efforts, 
much like a technological shock can increase the productivity 
of an investment. Although rival interests will always have an 
incentive to generate “studies” that support their positions, a 
well-executed systematic analysis can be of great help to a 
particular group by making its lobbying more effective. Careful 
analyses can also inform rival groups about the size of the costs 
associated with specific policy alternatives. The education of 
the public and policymakers in terms of the actual and 
potential costs of regulation thus can play a useful and 
important role in the political economy of the policy reform 
process. Endnotes
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1.  This section builds on Kroszner (2000a, 2000b) and Kroszner and 
Strahan (forthcoming).
2. Joskow and Noll (1981) call this explanation “normative analysis as 
positive theory.”
3. Hellwig (1999) has developed political-economy arguments to 
explain various practices and regulations in corporate finance based 
on the contrasting interests and organization costs facing insiders 
versus outsiders. For example, he interprets corporate financial 
structure choices, such as the “pecking order” preference for internal 
over external sources of funds, in terms of protection of incumbent 
management against outsiders. Also see Fischel (1997).
4. In addition, groups with completely unconnected interests may 
form “support trading” or “log-rolling” coalitions. Here, two groups 
may agree to support each other even if the members of one group are 
not affected by the regulations that the other group wants. Tariffs are 
a classic case of log rolling, in which, say, lumber and glass producers 
support each other’s call for higher protection, thereby providing 
greater support for higher tariffs than would otherwise be the case 
(Irwin and Kroszner 1996).
5. Becker (1983) argues that competition among lobbying groups thus 
will lead to the most efficient (lowest deadweight cost) regulations 
being chosen, so there is a tendency for regulation to be “efficient” in 
this sense. Wittman (1995) takes this argument further to conclude 
that both democratic institutions and outcomes are efficient. For 
studies on obstacles to optimal reforms, see Kroszner (1999a), 
Kroszner and Strahan (forthcoming), Rajan and Zingales 
(forthcoming), and Rodrik (1996).
6. When the constraint of future elections is less binding on 
politicians, they may engage in less rent sharing and provide windfalls 
to targeted groups. McGuire and Olson (1996), however, argue that 
less democratic regimes may be better able to insulate themselves from 
rent seeking and may find it in their own interest to pursue economic 
policies in the public interest.
7. An example is the Community Reinvestment Act. Also, flat rate 
deposit insurance tends to subsidize the smaller and riskier banks at 
the expense of the larger, better diversified, and safer banks. Lobbying 
for flat rate deposit insurance historically has been consistent with this 
pattern of relative benefits (Calomiris and White 1994 and 
Economides, Hubbard, and Palia 1996).
8. Gershenkron (1962), for example, argues that the German 
government fostered the development of strong universal banks in 
Germany, at the expense of financial market development, to promote 
rapid economic development in the nineteenth century.
9.  This provides another example of the endogeneity of the interests 
with respect to the regulatory structure.
10. The government also raises revenues thorough seigniorage, 
and the ability to tax through inflation is another reason for the 
government’s long involvement with monetary and banking affairs. 
11. Kane (1996) argues that bank regulators and beneficiaries of 
restrictions on the geographic expansion of banks purposefully 
misinformed the public and legislators about the costs of the 
regulations. Only a combination of large failures and costly bailouts 
(with academic studies explaining why the bailouts were so costly) was 
able to change the perception of the social welfare effects of the 
regulations. Jensen (1991) argues that much popular support for 
corporate governance regulation protecting incumbent management 
arises primarily from ignorance, rather than from intentional 
misinformation; thus, more policy-relevant research is important 
to effect reform.References
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